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Introduction
The Great Recession and the resulting European debt crisis have revived the debate about deeper …scal integration in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU is an atypical monetary union because monetary policy is decided at the central (European) level while …scal policy is carried out at the sub-central (member-state) level (Bordo et al. 2013) .
1 Some observers argue that national automatic stabilizers provided insu¢ cient income insurance during the crisis as some EMU member states lost access to private capital markets and conclude that common …scal stabilization mechanisms are necessary to make EMU more sustainable and more resilient against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks (Bertola 2013 , IMF 2013 . The main concerns in this debate relate to the issues of permanent transfer ‡ows within the currency union and moral hazard. In particular, national governments might neglect structural reforms or …scal consolidation. How could a …scal risk sharing mechanism in the euro area be designed? In the so-called Four Presidents'Report published in 2012, the former President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, has suggested the following: "An EMU …scal capacity with a limited asymmetric shock absorption function could take the form of an insurance-type system between euro area countries. [...] The speci…c design of such a function could follow two broad approaches. The …rst would be a macroeconomic approach, where contributions and disbursements would be based on ‡uctuations in cyclical revenue and expenditure items [...] . The second could be based on a microeconomic approach, and be more directly linked to a speci…c public function sensitive to the economic cycle, such as unemployment insurance." (Van Rompuy 2012). The European Commission and more recently Jean-Claude Juncker in the Five Presidents' report built upon this initiative with own blueprints for the EMU (European Commission 2012 , Juncker 2015 .
Since then, the perspectives of a European …scal union and di¤erent reform proposals along the lines of the Four Presidents' report have been analyzed in various studies.
2 For the 'macroeconomic approach', suggestions include a cyclical shock absorber based on output gaps (Enderlein et al. 2013 ) and a stabilization fund for the 1 In the following we equivalently use "EA", "EMU" and "Eurozone" to refer to the 18 member states of the European Currency Union that had introduced the euro in 2014.
2 First analyses of potential insurance e¤ects if the EMU were more …scally integrated date back to the introduction of the euro (Fatás 1998 and Forni and Reichlin 1999) , adding to the vast literature on insurance e¤ects in existing …scal federations such as the US (see e.g. Bayoumi and Masson 1995 and Asdrubali et al. 1996) . More recent contributions include Bargain et al. (2013) who analyze the economic implications of a fully integrated European tax and transfer system and a …scal equalization mechanism based on taxing capacity and expenditure needs for 11 founding members of the euro area, and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2013) who ask to what extent economic shocks would be absorbed by the center if the EU were as …scally integrated as the US. The question of how to optimally design insurance mechanisms and the political economy of …scal unions has also gained renewed interest in the more theoretical literature (cf. Evers 2012 , Farhi and Werning 2014 , Luque et al. 2014 euro area (Furceri and Zdzienicka 2015) . For the 'microeconomic approach', the discussion has focused on the idea of a common EMU-wide unemployment insurance system (henceforth EMU-UI) as proposed among others by Deinzer (2004) , Dullien (2014a) and Andor (2014) .
3 Previous studies on the economic e¤ects of an EMU-UI system are based on aggregate macro-level data and focus on overall net contributions across euro area member states. This is the …rst paper that provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of a wide range of design options for an EMU-UI system based on household micro data. 4 Our counterfactual experiment covers the period since the start of the euro in 1999 until 2013. The analysis includes the current 18 member states (EA 18) and simulates a sample of repeated cross-sections for each member state combining micro data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS). We focus on redistributive and stabilizing e¤ects of a basic EMU-UI scheme that partly replaces national UI systems. We quantify the coverage and stabilization gaps. These are de…ned as the di¤erences in coverage and stabilization between i) the benchmark scenario of national UI alone and ii) a reform scenario where EMU-UI and national UI coexist as explained further below. Coverage and stabilization gaps are calculated at the aggregate household level as well as for di¤erent sociodemographic groups within each country. Automatic …scal stabilization e¤ects are decomposed into household income and government budget stabilization. In addition, we explore the e¤ects of experience rating and compare the basic EMU-UI scheme to a variant with 'contingent', i.e., trigger-based bene…t payments that provide income insurance only if the labor market situation deteriorates signi…cantly in a given member state. Moreover, we run several sensitivity checks regarding coverage and generosity levels of the scheme. We also discuss various concerns and potential adverse e¤ects of an EMU-UI system, in particular the view that such a system would lead to a transfer union in Europe and moral hazard issues. Importantly, the aim of the paper is not to serve as a policy proposal but rather as a conceptual experiment, providing general insights into the e¤ects of various design options for a basic EMU-UI.
Our main results are as follows. We …nd that a basic EMU-UI scheme with a replacement rate of 50 per cent, a maximum duration of bene…t receipt of 12 months and a broad coverage of all new unemployed with previous employment income could be implemented with a relatively small annual budget. Over the period 2000-13, average 3 See also IAB (2013), Centre for European Policy Studies (2014), Dullien et al. (2014) and Lellouch and Sode (2014) . Claeys et al. (2014) provide an overview of policy challenges associated with an EMU-UI system. 4 Brandolini et al. (2014) and Jara and Sutherland (2014) also use micro data to analyze an EMU-UI system. The focus of their analyses di¤ers from ours as in contrast to this study, the former considers a notional EMU-UI system backing national UI systems and thus disregards EMU-UI transfers at the micro level, while the latter assumes EMU-UI bene…ts to top up national bene…ts if minimum requirements are not met by national UI systems. In addition, these papers cover shorter time periods and fewer countries than our paper. bene…ts would have amounted to roughly 47 billion euro per year, …nanced by a uniform contribution rate across member states of 1.56 per cent on employment income. The scheme is not designed to give rise to permanent redistribution across countries because only short-term (rather than structural) unemployment is insured. Nevertheless our simulations reveal that a small number of member states would have been net contributors or net recipients in each year of our simulation period. Largest net contributors are Austria, Germany and the Netherlands with average yearly net contributions of 0.19-0.39 per cent of GDP. Latvia and Spain are the largest net recipients (average yearly net bene…ts of 0.36 and 0.54 per cent of GDP).
We show that a basic EMU-UI scheme can provide insurance by stabilizing household incomes and government budgets. We compare automatic stabilization e¤ects under dual insurance (the combination of national UI and EMU-UI) and the status quo. For 2009, the year with the most signi…cant surge in unemployment across EA member states, we …nd that the average (unweighted) stabilization gap, that is the potential gain in stabilization through an EMU-UI for household incomes, would have amounted to 12 per cent of the gross income shock at the EA-level. Largest gaps are found for Southern European countries (e.g. 18 per cent in Italy, 17 per cent in Greece) and the Baltics (22 per cent in Latvia). Government budgets would have been stabilized by on average 6 per cent of the gross income shock in 2009. This is because governments would have spent less on national UI. The combined stabilization impact on household incomes and government budgets would have equalled 0.3 per cent of GDP on average, with values up to 1.1 (0.9) per cent in Latvia (Estonia). Schemes with lower coverage ratios and generosity levels generate smaller cross-country transfers but also reduce desired insurance e¤ects.
Turning next to within-country heterogeneity, we …nd the largest coverage and stabilization gains for the young and, perhaps surprisingly, also for high-skilled unemployed. The reason for the former is that the young often do not meet eligibility conditions of national UI while they are covered by the simulated EMU-UI. The result for the high-skilled is due to a higher proportion of short-term relative to long-term unemployed (who are not eligible to EMU-UI) among them.
Finally, we consider a contingent bene…t scheme which is activated if the unemployment rate in a given member state is 1 percentage point higher than in one of the previous three years. Under this system no member state would have been in a permanent net contributing/receiving position. With 22 billion euro per year, the overall budget and thus the amount of cross-country redistribution would have been less than half as large as under the non-contingent scheme in the baseline.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss di¤erent alternatives how a common EMU-UI system could be designed. In addition, we present key features of the simulated EMU-UI schemes. Section 3 describes the framework of the analysis. Baseline results are presented in section 4. Alternative EMU-UI schemes with experience rating and contingent bene…ts are analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Possible characteristics of an EMU-UI system Design options. A common unemployment insurance system for the euro area could be designed in various ways. Three key options have been discussed in the literature and in the policy debate so far. A …rst option would be a common EMU-UI system that provides a basic level of insurance by partly replacing national unemployment insurance systems. Bene…ts from the euro area system could be topped up by additional payments from national unemployment insurance systems. Hence, there would be room for diversity across member states so that existing di¤erences with regard to replacement rates and bene…t duration could be preserved. The EMU-UI system would be …nanced by social insurance contributions with a contribution rate that could be uniform across Eurozone member states or country-speci…c and time-variant to restrict cross-country transfers.
5 An important feature of such a scheme is that it would provide income insurance to the unemployed (under certain eligibility conditions) irrespective of the size of the unemployment shock in a given member state. As an alternative, a common scheme could provide income stabilization only in the event of large (unemployment) shocks. Such contingent unemployment bene…ts would be triggered if the level and/or change in overall unemployment has reached a pre-determined threshold in a given period. 6 National unemployment insurance systems would still be in place in normal times. As a third option, the euro area unemployment insurance scheme could complement national systems by providing additional transfers which would either top up national bene…ts or kick in if national bene…ts expire. The payout rules of this scheme could be trigger-based as well. Such a system would be comparable to the US unemployment insurance system where regular state bene…ts can be complemented by two types of bene…ts extension programs which are at least partly provided by the federal government, the Extended Bene…t program (EB) and emergency bene…ts. Concerns. A major concern with an EMU-UI system is that it would lead to permanent transfers across euro area member states. How do the three variants for an EMU-UI system di¤er with regard to the risk of permanent redistribution? A 5 Cf. Dolls et al. (2014) and Dullien (2014b) . 6 Cf. Gros (2014) . Other triggers could be the short-term unemployment rate or the insured unemployment rate which is used in the US unemployment insurance system (besides the total unemployment rate) as a trigger for bene…t extension programs (Nicholson et al. 2014) .
7 Cf. Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2012) and Nicholson et al. (2014) . Note that in the US regular state bene…ts are paid for a period which usually lasts not longer than 6 months. The large extensions of unemployment insurance provided by the US federal government in the 2009-12 period increased the bene…t duration to 99 weeks in many US states. Unemployment bene…ts in the EMU are usually granted much longer than regular state bene…ts in the US (Esser et al. 2013). basic EMU-UI scheme would not be designed to generate permanent redistribution because such a scheme conditions on changes in employment status rather than on unemployment levels. Di¤erences in unemployment rates alone do not (necessarily) lead to permanent redistribution because bene…ts would be targeted to cyclical (shorttime) unemployment and would expire after a certain time span. It may nevertheless happen that (net) transfers are unevenly distributed across member states if ‡ows into unemployment diverge permanently or if there are permanent di¤erences in the level of short-term unemployment.
8 This risk could be reduced by claw-back mechanisms based on experience rating or if transfers were trigger-based as under the contingent bene…t scheme. Clearly, redistributive e¤ects of the former (latter) scheme would depend on the exact claw-back mechanism (choice of the trigger). The risk of permanent transfers would be high with an EMU-UI scheme that provides extended bene…ts after national unemployment bene…ts expire because such a scheme would be likely to cover not only cyclical, but also structural unemployment. Moreover, it could incentivize governments to cut national unemployment insurance bene…ts as the EMU-UI system would step in.
A further concern related to moral hazard is that a common EMU-UI system could undermine incentives for national governments to address structural weaknesses of the labor market. One argument against this claim is that national governments would still bear the cost of long-term unemployment under a basic, contingent or non-contingent EMU-UI system. This argument is much weaker, however, with an extended bene…t program which is likely to cover also structural unemployment. Moreover, incentives to pursue active labor market policies such as short-time work could be adversely a¤ected by an EMU-UI system given that the cost of short-term unemployment would be borne by the common pool.
Additional concerns relate to other moral hazard issues including administrative manipulation and adverse incentive e¤ects at the individual level with regard to job search and labor supply. National administrations would have incentives to use their discretion to increase the number of bene…t recipients. Incentives to manipulate would depend on the characteristics of the system, e.g. the required employment period or a waiting period for EMU-UI bene…ts. The longer both periods are, the more costly would administrative manipulation be, but longer periods would also reduce desired insurance e¤ects. Distortions at the individual level depend on the overall bene…t level (EMU plus national bene…ts) and duration relative to the status quo. The e¤ect of a common EMU-UI system on migration responses in case of unemployment is ambiguous. The portability of unemployment bene…t claims might increase the willingness to migrate and to search for a job in a member state with better labor market conditions, but could potentially also reduce incentives for active job search if EMU-UI bene…s are more generous than national bene…ts.
Key features of the simulated EMU-UI schemes. The current debate focuses on a basic EMU-UI system (contingent and non-contingent) as the risk of permanent transfers and moral hazard issues are perceived to be less severe compared to an extended bene…t system. In the baseline scenario, we therefore focus on a basic, noncontingent EMU-UI scheme with a replacement rate of 50 per cent of previous gross earnings and a broad coverage of the short-term unemployed.
9 Eligible to EMU-UI bene…ts are all newly unemployed with previous employment income for a period of up to 12 months (upper bound estimate in terms of coverage). The scheme is …nanced by social insurance contributions with a uniform contribution rate across member states and calibrated to be revenue-neutral at the Eurozone-level (but not the member-state level) over the simulation period. This scheme is labeled as variant A henceforth. In addition, we explore how our results change if we vary some key parameters of the baseline scheme in terms of coverage rates and generosity levels. We introduce a waiting period of 2 months after job loss before eligibility to EMU-UI bene…ts begins in order to diminish the e¤ect of seasonal unemployment and limit the maximum bene…t to 50 per cent of median income (variant B). Variant C has a replacement rate of 35 per cent of gross income which is on average equivalent to a replacement rate of 50 per cent of net income. Bene…ts are capped at 50 per cent of median income, but there is no waiting period. Variant D combines variants B and C (maximum bene…t amount of 50 per cent of median income, 35 per cent replacement rate, waiting period). Variant E is based on variant D, but only those short-term unemployed that receive national UI bene…ts are eligible to EMU-UI bene…ts (lower bound estimate in terms of coverage). Additionally, we compare the baseline EMU-UI scheme (variant A) to two alternative scenarios in which we impose revenue-neutrality at the member-state level (experience rating) and make the basic EMU-UI scheme trigger-based (contingent bene…ts). The analysis of redistributive and stabilizing properties of these additional scenarios is an important extension to the previous literature because they are often assumed to alleviate the risk of permanent redistribution and moral hazard issues.
data, we rely on representative household micro data for the EA18 using EUROMOD, a static tax-bene…t calculator for the European Union countries. EUROMOD is mainly based on cross-sectional micro data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat (Eurostat 2012 ) which we combine with micro data from the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS). 10 The key advantage of our approach in the present context is that we exploit both detailed income distribution information contained in EUROMOD as well as information on changing labor market patterns over time contained in the LFS. We are thus able to account for heterogeneity in various characteristics of the populations in di¤erent countries which macro data approaches cannot capture.
In our simulation experiment, we introduce an unemployment insurance scheme for the EA18 member states and ask what would have happened if such a scheme had been introduced from the start of the euro in 1999. As there are neither panel data nor repeated cross-sectional data available containing both income distributions and labor market conditions for all EA member states over this period, we construct a series of reweighted cross-sections for the period of analysis which exactly replicates changes in labor market conditions (unemployment rate, share of short-and long-term unemployed, size and composition of the labor force) and average earnings over time.
11
Our baseline input data is from EU-SILC 2008, the most recent data available with the version of EUROMOD used, including the EA18 member states. For each country, these data are …rst reweighted to re ‡ect labor market conditions as observed in 1999 and then reweighted subsequently for each year of the analysis.
From the LFS, we impute changes in (un)employment rates, size of the labor force, shares of short-and long-term unemployment, and coverage rates of national UI systems for 18 gender-age-education strata (male/female, three age groups, three education levels) on an annual basis. We simulate (un)employment changes over time for each of the 18 socio-demographic subgroups so that our series of reweighted cross-sections precisely matches these dimensions both at the subgroup and aggregate level. Earnings growth is imputed from the AMECO-database in order to account for changes in the tax base of the EMU-UI and national UI systems. These imputations ensure that our reweighted micro data are consistent with aggregate statistics in each year of our simulation period (see Technical Appendix A.2 for further information). The analysis at the subgroup level allows us to examine individual heterogeneity within each member 10 Sutherland and Figari (2013) provide more detailed information on EUROMOD, the underlying input data and validation. The EU-LFS, conducted by the national statistical institutes across Europe and processed by Eurostat, is a representative household survey covering the years from 1983 onwards. It is the most important source for labor market statistics in the EU. Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey for further information.
11 See Immvervoll et al. (2006) , Bargain et al. (2012) and Dolls et al. (2012) for further applications of the reweighting approach. Similar imputations from the LFS to EUROMOD input data have been conducted by Navicke et al. (2014) and Salgado et al. (2014). state showing which groups in the population would bene…t/lose from the introduction of an EMU-UI system (section 4.4). In addition, we construct a national UI calculator that incorporates all important policy rules of national UI systems over the period 2000-13 and simulate national unemployment bene…ts in addition to EMU-UI bene…ts in case of dual insurance and in the benchmark scenario.
12
Our analysis is based on the following simplifying assumptions. First, we do not take into account general equilibrium e¤ects of an EMU-UI system, i.e., our analysis remains in a partial equilibrium context. This implies that we abstract both from potential moral hazard of national governments and administrations which could have adverse labor market e¤ects as well as from potential growth-enhancing e¤ects of an EMU-UI scheme. Accounting for these macroeconomic feedback e¤ects would require to link our micro data to a macro-econometric simulation model (Peichl 2009). Second, we do not simulate individual behavioral responses, e.g. potential migration responses, changes in hours worked or di¤erent patterns of entries and exits to the labor force which could follow the introduction of an EMU-UI. 13 In the light of these assumptions, our results should be interpreted as '…rst-round'e¤ects of an EMU-UI system. A further assumption relates to the interaction between EMU-UI and national UI systems given that a basic EMU-UI system analyzed in this paper would partly replace national UI systems. As elaborated in section 4.3, we assume that national UI systems would top up the EMU-UI scheme if national UI systems are more generous in their coverage or replacement rate so that no unemployed would be worse o¤ after the introduction of an EMU-UI system. Finally, we run our simulations as if the EA18 had existed from 1999 onwards as it would complicate the interpretation of our results if we included new member states only after adoption of the euro. Figure 1 indicates that the share of unemployed relative to the total labor force receiving EMU-UI bene…ts (variant A, green line) follows closely trends in overall unemployment. However, coverage rates of EMU-UI measured as the share of unemployed receiving EMU-UI bene…ts relative to all unemployed (orange line) diverge from unemployment rates in times of rising or falling unemployment as can be seen, for instance, for Germany in the early 2000s or for Greece, Ireland and Spain during the recent crisis period. The reason is that the share of long-term unemployed usually goes up (down) in prolonged recessions (upswings) and that EMU-UI bene…ts are only paid to short-term unemployed. Figure 1 shows further that coverage rates of EMU-UI di¤er substantially across EA countries ranging from an average of 34 per cent in Slovakia to 79 per cent in Finland (EMU-UI variant A) which is due to di¤erences in the share of short-term unemployment. In the following sections, we show that EMU-UI schemes with a waiting period of 2 months (variants B, D and E) would reduce redistributive and insurance e¤ects relative to the baseline variant as seasonal unemployment (like in tourism) would to some extent be excluded from coverage. Finally, Figure 1 points to a signi…cant coverage gap between our simulated EMU-UI scheme and national UI revealed by a comparison of the orange and red lines. Coverage of national UI is particularly low in some Southern and Eastern European member states such as Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta or Slovakia, all with average coverage rates of the short-term unemployed over the period 2000-13 below 15 per cent. Share EMU-UI recipients Coverage EMU-UI Coverage National-UI N o te : U n e m p loy m e nt ra te a n d sh a re E M U -U I re c ip ie nts m e a su re d in p e r c e nt o f th e la b o r fo rc e . C ove ra g e E M U -U I a n d n a tio n a l U I c a lc u la te d a s nu m b e r o f sh o rt-te rm u n e m p loye d re c e iv in g U I b e n e …ts re la tive to to ta l nu m b e r o f u n e m p loye d . C ove ra g e n a tio n a l U I in c lu d e s U I b e n e …ts a n d a ssista n c e . If c ove ra g e in fo rm a tio n is m issin g in th e L F S fo r a g ive n c o u ntry in o n e ye a r, it is im p u te d fro m th e c lo se st c o u ntry -ye a r c e ll ava ila b le . S o u rc e s: L F S a n d ow n c a lc u la tio n s b a se
Budgetary e¤ects and …nancial ‡ows
Based on simulated EMU-UI bene…ts and the overall tax base, we calculate the contribution rate that would have led to revenue-neutrality at the EA-level over the period 2000-13. For the baseline scheme (variant A), the contribution rate amounts to 1.56 per cent on employment income. 14 Next, we simulate contribution payments to EMU-UI under the assumption that the scheme can run de…cits and surpluses in single years. Figure 2 shows the evolution of contributions and bene…ts for the EA18. While contributions would have almost constantly grown over the period due to growth in nominal earnings, bene…t payments would have ‡uctuated to a much larger extent. On average, bene…ts and contributions amount to roughly 47 billion euro per year. The scheme would have run surpluses from 2000-03 and from 2005-08 and de…cits in the remaining years, in particular during the recent …nancial and economic crisis. Finally, we compare the baseline EMU-UI scheme (variant A) to variants with lower coverage and generosity levels (variants B-E). Results are presented in Figure 4 and in Table 3 in the Appendix. Figure 4 shows average yearly net contributions under variants A (blue bars), B (green bars, maximum bene…t amount capped at 50 per cent of a country's median income and no bene…ts paid within the …rst two months of the unemployment spell) and D (red bars, based on variant B, but with a gross replacement rate of 35 per cent instead of 50 per cent). Table 3 shows the full set of results. Average net contributions under variants B-E are usually smaller than in the baseline. France becomes a permanent net recipient under variants B-D, albeit with average net contributions below -0.1 per cent of GDP. In Estonia and Portugal, the average net position changes from recipient to contributor which is due to low median incomes in these member states. 
Automatic …scal stabilization
Automatic …scal stabilization is associated with the ability of taxes and transfers to automatically stabilize disposable income and consequently consumption in the event of macroeconomic shocks. This relies on a simple mechanism: in the presence of a given negative shock to gross income, taxes decline and transfers increase, with the decline in disposable income being smaller than the shock to gross income (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000 , Kniesner and Ziliak 2002 , Dolls et al. 2012 ). Several components of government budgets are a¤ected by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate to smooth the business cycle, with progressive income taxes and unemployment bene…ts being the most prominent examples.
There are two channels through which an EMU-UI system that partly replaces national UI systems can achieve additional automatic stabilization e¤ects: First, it can stabilize household incomes if the EMU-UI system had higher replacement rates or a broader coverage than national UI systems. 16 Second, it can stabilize government budgets as governments could (partly) cut back national UI bene…ts. In order to compare stabilization e¤ects in case of dual insurance of national UI and EMU-UI with the benchmark of national UI alone, we have to make an assumption how national UI systems would be adjusted after the introduction of an EMU-UI system. In our simulations, we assume that national UI bene…ts top up EMU-UI bene…ts if the former are more generous than the latter and are fully cut back otherwise. If, for example, the replacement rate of national UI is 60 per cent of gross income and the replacement rate of EMU-UI 50 per cent, we assume that the replacement rate of EMU-UI is topped up by 10 percentage points such that the overall replacement rate is still 60 per cent. If national unemployment bene…ts are less generous than EMU-UI bene…ts, we assume that no national UI bene…ts are paid out. In order to properly account for these policy adjustments, we employ a national UI calculator as described in section 3 and simulate national unemployment bene…ts in addition to EMU-UI bene…ts in case of dual insurance and in the benchmark scenario.
We follow Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and Dolls et al. (2012) and estimate automatic stabilization e¤ects by calculating stabilization coe¢ cients for household incomes, hh , and government budgets, gov , that show to what extent (un)employment shocks are absorbed by changes in unemployment bene…ts and social insurance contributions. is computed using arithmetic changes ( ) in bene…t and contribution payments as well as changes in employment income in a given year t ( P
) which are aggregated across individuals i in each member state (subscript t suppressed for simplicity). Note that changes in employment income as well as in contribution and bene…t payments are calculated for employment changes along the extensive margin only in order to isolate the stabilizing e¤ect in the event of (un)employment shocks from (intensive margin) income changes. The household income stabilization coe¢ cient for national UI and EMU-UI reads:
In fact, UI has a cushioning e¤ect both in booms and recessions as bene…t and contribution payments react countercyclically to changes in employment. In our simulations, we want to separate the cushioning e¤ects in upswings and downturns. Therefore, we paid in a recession, this should support private incomes and dampen adverse movements in aggregate demand. 16 Precisely speaking, a broader coverage would lead to more stabilization if EMU-UI bene…ts were higher than means-tested transfers such as social assistance that those unemployed not eligible to UI bene…ts would receive. divide changes in bene…ts and contributions from t to t + 1 by the absolute value of the aggregate gross income change so that hh is positive (negative) when unemployment rises (declines): hh is computed both for the benchmark of national UI alone and for the scenario of dual insurance so that the gain in stabilization can be expressed as follows:
(2) Stabilization of government budgets is measured accordingly:
gov shows to what extent government budgets are stabilized in the event of unemployment shocks due to the fact that national UI bene…t and contribution payments have to increase less in case of dual insurance relative to the benchmark ( gov > 0). Conversely, when unemployment goes down, unemployment bene…t and contribution payments decline less in case of dual insurance than in the status quo ( gov < 0). Note, however, that government budgets would not be a¤ected by rising (declining) UI bene…t payments if UI contribution rates could be raised (reduced) in a revenue-neutral way ( gov = 0). As for EMU-UI, we calculate changes in contribution payments for national UI based on contribution rates that balance budgets over the whole simulation period. Our measure for government budget stabilization is thus based on the assumption that governments would not alter UI contribution rates instantaneously when national UI disbursements change. Note further that our estimate for gov is a lower bound estimate as national governments would not need to pay any longer social assistance to those short-term unemployed covered by EMU-UI, but not by national UI. For the same reason, our estimates for the gain in household income stabilization represent an upper bound estimate.
Figure 5 presents household income stabilization coe¢ cients for the so-called GI-IPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) for the recent crisis period. The blue, green and red bars show stabilization e¤ects under dual insurance for three variants of EMU-UI (A , B and D), while the orange bars depict income stabilization in the benchmark scenario of national UI. 17 Another important result evident in Figure 5 is that stabilization e¤ects are weaker in the more recent years of the crisis which is due to a growing share of non-eligible long-term unemployed in these years as documented in section 4.1. How large is the combined stabilization e¤ect of household incomes and government budgets relative to GDP? In order to estimate the additional stabilization e¤ect in case of dual insurance relative to national UI alone, we add the stabilization gain for households (numerator in formula 2) to the stabilization e¤ect for governments (numerator in formula 3):
These estimates do not re ‡ect potential growth e¤ects of EMU-UI, but merely relate changes in bene…t and contribution payments following entries into or exits from unemployment in a given year to GDP in that year. Macroeconomic stabilization effects would depend on the …scal multiplier of government spending and the marginal propensity to consume of individuals bene…ting from EMU-UI. Figure 7 shows stabilization e¤ects for the baseline EMU-UI scheme (variant A). In several countries, largest stabilization gains would have been achieved in the recent crisis period with cushioning e¤ects up to 1.1 per cent of GDP in Latvia, 0.9 per cent in Estonia, 0.75 per cent in Ireland and Spain or 0.5 per cent in Cyprus. Germany and Luxembourg belong to those countries that would have been stabilized mainly in the early 2000s and very little afterwards due to improving labor market conditions in the following years. In these two countries as well as in Austria, government budget stabilization would have played a more important role than household income stabilization in some years. 
Within-country heterogeneity
An important contribution of this paper is to explore the e¤ects of an EMU-UI scheme at the micro level. While the previous sections were focussing on aggregate e¤ects across countries, this section asks what impact dual insurance of EMU-UI and national UI systems would have on di¤erent individuals within each country. If EMU-UI bene…ts were indeed topped up by national UI bene…ts in case national UI regulations are more generous (higher coverage or replacement rates) and in the absence of further policy changes, no unemployed would be worse o¤ after the introduction of an EMU-UI system. As outlined above, both is assumed in our simulation exercise. While all short-term unemployed receiving an unemployment bene…t that is larger than the EMU-UI bene…t were not a¤ected, those not covered by national UI or with an EMU-UI bene…t exceeding the national one would gain from the introduction of an EMU-UI system. Whether the employed would gain or lose crucially depends on the di¤erence in contribution rates in case of dual insurance and national UI alone. Table 1 compares contribution rates for di¤erent variants of EMU-UI topped up by national UI (columns A-E) with contribution rates in the benchmark scenario of national UI alone (column NAT-UI). Columns A-E display the sum of the uniform EMU-UI and the country-speci…c national UI contribution rates necessary to top up EMU-UI if needed. Both contribution rates are calculated such that revenue-neutrality over the whole simulation period is ensured. Column NAT-UI shows revenue-neutral contribution rates for national UI alone which are calculated under the assumption that national UI bene…ts were only paid to the short-term unemployed to make sure that contribution rates are indeed comparable. Table 1 reveals that the additional stabilization achieved under dual insurance comes at the cost of higher contribution rates than in the benchmark case of national UI alone. This is mainly due to coverage gaps between EMU-UI and national UI (section 4.1). Only under variant E (EMU-UI with actual coverage rate of national UI systems), contribution rates under dual insurance would be lower in a few countries. Interestingly, both countries which are -on averagenet contributors (Belgium, Germany) as well as net recipients (France, Ireland, Spain) belong to this group. The reason is that in a scenario of EMU-UI where national eligibility rules are applied, not only the evolution of the short-term unemployment rate in a given country vis-à-vis the rest of the EA would determine whether contribution rates under dual insurance are higher or lower than in the benchmark, but also the extent to which the unemployed are covered by national UI systems.
While the employed would face higher contribution rates in all variants except for variant E, an interesting question is which socio-demographic groups would bene…t most from dual insurance. To answer this question, we split the labor force into 18 subgroups according to three socio-demographic characteristics, namely gender, age and education (cf. section 3). The groups solely comprise individuals who are part of the labor force, i.e. who are either employed or unemployed. Figure 11 in the Appendix shows average short-and long-term unemployment rates as well as the average share of winners in each subgroup over the period 2000-13. In each group, winners are those short-term unemployed who are better o¤ under dual insurance compared to the benchmark, either because of broader coverage or higher generosity of EMU-UI. Figure 11 reveals that the young tend to bene…t most, simply because the short-term unemployment rate is highest among the young. In a few countries, almost all short-term unemployed would gain under dual insurance (Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia) indicating that EMU-UI would not only increase coverage, but also provide more generous transfers. Figure 11 further shows that the short-term unemployment rate decreases by skill in the majority of countries. Figure 8 presents coverage (stabilization) gaps which are calculated as the di¤erence in average coverage rates (stabilization coe¢ cients hh ) under dual insurance (variant A) and the benchmark (national UI alone). For the stabilization gap, we take absolute values of stabilization coe¢ cients so that the cushioning e¤ects in booms and recessions do not cancel out. In several member states, largest coverage and stabilization gaps are found for young unemployed who often do not meet eligibility conditions of national UI due to insu¢ cient contribution periods. Interestingly, high-skilled unemployed tend to face larger coverage and stabilization gaps and hence would gain more in terms of insurance than the low-or medium-skilled. This can be explained by a higher proportion of short-term relative to long-term unemployed among the high-skilled. In other words, long-term unemployment which is not covered by EMU-UI is more prevalent among the low-and medium-skilled (see Figure 11 ). To illustrate this …nding, take France or Spain as an example. In these countries, the share of winners is higher among the low-skilled due to higher short-term unemployment rates. However, longterm unemployment rates also decrease by skill which explains why the high-skilled would face larger gains in stabilization compared to the low-or medium skilled.
Our results suggest that less stringent eligibility conditions could improve income insurance especially for the young, while more generous UI for the short-term unemployed might not be an e¤ective policy to provide income protection for the low-skilled unemployed. 5 Alternative scenarios
Experience rating
Until now, we have analyzed an EMU-UI system with a uniform contribution rate across member states that is revenue-neutral at the EA-level. The analysis in the previous section has shown that under EMU-UI variant A, four member states would have been either a permanent net contributor (Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) or net recipient (Spain). Therefore, an interesting analytical exercise is to calculate countryspeci…c contribution rates that balance the EMU-UI budget in each member state. This is done for illustrative purposes to show gains and losses across countries and should not be interpreted as a policy alternative as this extreme form of experience rating would undermine the insurance e¤ects of risk-sharing. Table 2 presents country-speci…c contribution rates for the di¤erent variants of EMU-UI that would have led to revenue-neutrality over the period 2000-13. The last row of Table 2 shows uniform contribution rates that balance the budget at the EA, but not the member-state level. Given the di¤erences in net contributions across member states presented in the previous section, it is not surprising that country-speci…c contribution rates di¤er signi…cantly ranging from 0.75 per cent in the Netherlands to 3.29 per cent in Spain under variant A. Less generous schemes (columns B-E) require lower contribution rates for revenue-neutrality. Figure 9 presents average country-speci…c contribution rates for EMU-UI that balance national budgets in each year as well as maximum and minimum contribution rates over the period. In Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the three member states that would have been permanent net contributors, revenue-neutral contribution rates are always below the uniform (Eurozone-wide) contribution rate of 1.56 per cent (dashed horizontal line), while the opposite is true for Spain, the only permanent net recipient throughout the simulation period in the baseline scenario (variant A).
Contingent transfers
As a further variant, we simulate an EMU-UI scheme with contingent bene…ts which are activated once certain triggers are reached and analyze its stabilizing and redistributive properties, in particular whether such a scheme reduces cross-country transfers. Our choice of the trigger is guided by the US Extended Bene…t (EB) program which permits states to use either the insured or the total unemployment rate to qualify for extended unemployment bene…ts (Nicholson et al. 2014) . We choose the total unemployment rate as a trigger so that activation of contingent transfers is independent from eligibility conditions of national unemployment insurance systems. Precisely, bene…ts from the EMU-UI system are triggered if the unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than the unemployment rate in i) year t 1, ii) years t 1 or t 2, iii) years t 1 or t 2 or t 3. Longer look-back periods ensure that EMU-UI bene…ts can remain activated in sustained periods of high unemployment. 19 In all other dimensions (payout rules, uniform contribution rate across member states), the contingent bene…t schemes i-iii are identical to the baseline scheme (variant A) which implies that by construction member states are net contributors in those years when contingent bene…ts are not triggered. Table 5 in the Appendix shows that while with a three-year look-back period, contingent bene…ts would have been triggered in all member states at least once, they would not have been activated in Malta (Belgium and Malta) in any year with a twoyear (one-year) look-back period. The divergence in unemployment across countries since the start of the euro in 1999 becomes evident by a comparison of activation periods. While the short-term unemployed in Germany or Luxembourg, for instance, . Not surprisingly, with average yearly bene…t and contribution payments of 13, 19 and 22 billion euro at the Eurozone-level, the overall budget of the contingent bene…t schemes i-iii would have been signi…cantly lower than in our baseline scenario with non-contingent bene…ts (47 billion per year). Consequently, revenue-neutral contribution rates would have been less than half as large as in the baseline (0.42, 0.64 and 0.72 rather than 1.56 per cent). Figure 10 compares cumulative net contributions under the contingent bene…t schemes to the baseline (variant A). A key …nding is that a few member states change their net contributing position in terms of accumulated net contributions at the end of the simulation period (France, Slovenia). Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the three member states that would have been net contributors in each year in the baseline, are now net receivers in some years. In the Netherlands, accumulated net contributions are reduced by more than 50 per cent by the end of the simulation period relative to the baseline. Spain, a net recipient in the baseline throughout the simulation period, is a net contributor until 2007 and a net recipient in the remaining years. These results show that an EMU-UI system with contingent bene…ts could indeed provide more targeted transfers to member states which see their labor market conditions signi…cantly deteriorating.
What are the automatic stabilization e¤ects of such a scheme? Given that the contingent bene…t schemes considered here correspond to the non-contingent baseline scheme in all dimensions besides the activation of the scheme, stabilization e¤ects are similar once EMU-UI bene…ts are triggered. However, it must be taken into account that countries that have not reached the trigger (but might well be in a recession) would be worse o¤ compared to the baseline EMU-UI system as the link between contribution and bene…t payments would be broken. Households in these member states would need to …nance both their national unemployment insurance system as well as the EMU-UI system. This potential destabilizing e¤ect could be prevented by suspending contribution payments to the EMU-UI system under certain circumstances such as rising unemployment rates. N o te : B a se lin e a n d c o ntin g e nt b e n e …ts. C o ntin g e nt sch e m e i): B e n e …ts a re p a id if u n e m p loy m e nt ra te in a g ive n m e m b e r sta te in ye a r t is a t le a st 1 p e rc e nta g e p o int h ig h e r th a n in t-1 (o n e -ye a r lo o k -b a ck p e rio d ). C o ntin g e nt sch e m e ii): 2 -ye a r lo o k -b a ck p e rio d , i.e ., b e n e …ts a re trig g e re d if u n e m p loy m e nt ra te in ye a r t is a t le a st 1 p e rc e nta g e p o int h ig h e r th a n in t-1 O R t-2 . C o ntin g e nt sch e m e iii):
Conclusion
The economic crisis in the Eurozone has revived the debate on deeper …scal integration and has brought this topic to the top of the European policy agenda. A common unemployment insurance system is one key reform proposal which could serve as a …scal risk sharing mechanism in the EA. Supporters of this idea argue that a centralized EMU-UI system would dampen asymmetric shocks in the Eurozone and provide income insurance to those households which are most vulnerable. It would thus not only improve the economic resilience of EMU and make its institutional architecture more sustainable, but also strengthen the social dimension of European policy-making. However, main concerns include the risk of permanent transfer ‡ows across member states and moral hazard for national governments and administrations, which could lead to adverse labor market e¤ects. The aim of this paper has been to present di¤erent options for the design of a common unemployment insurance system and to assess their redistributive and stabilizing properties. Moreover, we have discussed how di¤erent design options would a¤ect moral hazard issues. In our empirical analysis, we have used counterfactual simulation techniques based on harmonized European micro data to examine the economic e¤ects of a hypothetical common EMU-UI system for the time period 2000-13.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. A basic scheme, partly replacing national unemployment insurance systems, with a replacement rate of 50 per cent, a maximum duration of bene…t receipt of 12 months and a broad coverage of all new unemployed with previous employment income could be implemented with a relatively small annual budget. On average, it would have amounted to 47 billion euro per year at the Eurozone-level …nanced by a contribution rate of 1.56 per cent on employment income. The scheme would have provided signi…cant (additional) stabilization to household incomes and government budgets relative to the status quo. In 2009, the average stabilization gain at EA-level would have amounted to 12 per cent for households and 6 per cent for government budgets. Stabilization e¤ects would have become smaller over the course of the crisis due to the coverage of short-term unemployed only. We …nd, perhaps surprisingly given that the scheme does not lead to permanent redistribution per se, that 4 out of 18 member states would have been either net contributor or net recipient in each year of our simulation period. Running various sensitivity checks including di¤erent coverage and generosity levels as well as experience rating, we show that there is a trade-o¤ between the degree of cross-country redistribution and desired automatic stabilization e¤ects.
In terms of within-country heterogeneity, we …nd that in particular young unemployed would bene…t from broader UI coverage while the employed would face higher social insurance contributions. Finally, our analysis shows that a common EMU-UI system with contingent bene…ts would lead to less cross-country redistribution as it would provide more targeted transfers to member states with deteriorating labor market conditions. However, contingent bene…ts can have undesirable side e¤ects such as a broken link between contribution and bene…t payments if bene…ts are not activated.
One should note that the simulations assume revenue-neutrality over the entire time span considered (2000-2013), but not in each period. This raises the issue of whether the EMU-UI would be allowed to issue debt. In our calculations the EMU-UI would have produced a surplus in its early phase, so that reserves would have been available to …nance higher bene…ts in the crisis. But there is, of course, a concern that political pressures would build up to let the EMU-UI accumulate more and more debt until it needs to be 'bailed out'by the member states. Clearly, while a balanced budget in each period would limit the ability of the system to act as a …scal stabilizer, an e¤ective debt limitation would be needed. One possible approach would be to start by deliberately accumulating reserves which would provide a bu¤er in the next recession.
We should emphasize that our analysis has a number of limitations which should be taken into account in the interpretation of the results. Most importantly, it is not the objective of this paper to establish whether or not the introduction of an EMU-UI scheme is desirable in terms of overall welfare. Our analysis focuses on the …nancial ‡ows implied by di¤erent unemployment insurance schemes and the ability of these ‡ows to act as an automatic stabilizer. In so far our analysis is purely positive, rather than normative. In addition, we take economic behavior as given. If EMU-UI had the desired stabilizing e¤ects, the …nancial ‡ows in the system would di¤er from those calculated here; the redistributive e¤ects would probably be smaller. However, if the moral hazard e¤ects dominated, the …nancial ‡ows from contributors to recipients could also be larger. Adding behavioral e¤ects to the analysis is a promising subject for future research. A Appendix:
A.1 Additional results in a given member state in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 (one-year look-back period).
Contingent scheme ii): 2-year look-back period, i.e., bene…ts are triggered if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2. Contingent scheme iii): 3-year look-back period, i.e., bene…ts are triggered if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2 OR t-3. Source: AMECO.
A.2 Reweighting procedure for modeling (un)employment changes
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national cross-sectional databases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di¤erential nonresponse. In our empirical analysis, we follow the approach taken by Immvervoll et al. (2006) , Bargain et al. (2012) and Dolls et al. (2012) and employ reweighting techniques to simulate a sample of repeated cross-sections for each EA member state over the period 2000-13. We impute various labor force characteristics from the LFS micro data based on 18 age-gender-education strata. For each subgroup-year cell, these are number of people in the labor force, unemployment rates, shares of short-and long-term unemployed as well as coverage rates of national UI systems. The 18 subgroups are de…ned according to the following socio-demographic characteristics: gender age (<30, 30-50, >50) education (low: not completed primary, primary and lower secondary; middle: upper secondary and post secondary; high: tertiary).
(Un)employment changes over the period of analysis are modeled at the subgroup level. An increase (a decrease) of the group-speci…c unemployment rate is computed by increasing the weights of the unemployed (employed) in each subgroup while the weights of the employed (unemployed) are decreased correspondingly, i.e., in e¤ect a fraction of employed (unemployed) individuals is made unemployed (employed). Hence, the size and composition of the labor force in each reweighted cross-section matches the labor force as re ‡ected in the LFS both at the subgroup and aggregate level. Growth in average earnings along the intensive margin, modeled in order to account for changes in the tax base, is imputed from the AMECO-database.
